by admin | Sep 11, 2026 | Consultancy Services, Health and Safety, Safety Update
A near miss can be easy to dismiss precisely because nobody was hurt. But the absence of injury does not prove that the controls worked. A credible near miss can reveal the same underlying failure that later causes a serious accident, giving managers an opportunity to act before the outcome depends on luck again.
A warning came before people were injured
In September 2026, the Health and Safety Executive reported a prosecution involving a scrap-metal site where an excavator-related near miss occurred just ten days before two members of the public were injured in a later event.
HSE found that the underlying failures in the earlier near miss were the same. Although the case arose in waste and recycling rather than construction, the management lesson transfers directly to construction sites where excavators, telehandlers, temporary access routes, lifting operations and changing layouts create comparable high-potential events.
Not every near miss is reportable under RIDDOR
Internal near-miss reporting and statutory reporting are not the same thing. Under the Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations 2013, specified dangerous occurrences must be reported by the responsible person.
HSE’s dangerous-occurrence guidance sets out the categories. A site event may deserve urgent internal investigation without meeting one of those statutory categories.
That means the first management question should not simply be “Do we have to report this to HSE?” It should be “What allowed this to happen, and could the next occurrence seriously hurt somebody?” RIDDOR screening then sits alongside the investigation rather than replacing it.
A near miss may show that the risk assessment is no longer valid
Regulation 3 of the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999 requires risk assessments to be reviewed where there is reason to suspect they are no longer valid or where there has been a significant change.
A near miss can provide exactly that reason. If a lifting plan assumes pedestrians will be excluded but someone enters the lifting zone because a barrier has been moved, the fact nobody was struck does not demonstrate success. It may show that one of the assumptions on which the plan depended is not reliable in practice.
The potential consequence should influence the response. A falling object missing somebody by two metres and the same object striking somebody can originate from exactly the same control failure.
Investigate causes, not just the person closest to the event
HSE’s HSG245, Investigating accidents and incidents, provides a practical framework based on gathering information, analysing it, identifying risk-control measures and developing and implementing an action plan.
Weak investigations often stop at the first human action: “the operator reversed without checking”, “the worker entered the exclusion zone” or “the supervisor did not notice”. Those facts may matter, but they are not always the underlying cause.
A stronger investigation asks why the behaviour was possible. Was physical segregation ineffective? Had the sequence changed? Was the method unrealistic for the actual site? Had a shortcut become normal practice? Was production pressure influencing decisions? Had the issue been reported previously? Was supervision appropriate?
Useful evidence may include photographs, CCTV, equipment data, witness accounts, RAMS, lifting or traffic plans, inspection records, competence information, permits and records of recent changes.
Corrective actions only count when they are implemented and tested
Many businesses investigate reasonably well and then lose control at the action stage. A report identifies actions, they are entered on a spreadsheet, a toolbox talk is delivered and the event is marked closed.
Corrective action should match the failure identified. If pedestrians can physically enter a plant operating area, changing the layout or providing effective segregation may be stronger than another verbal reminder. If a worker misunderstood a new procedure, targeted instruction or demonstration may be appropriate.
Each significant action should have an owner and a realistic completion date. For higher-potential events, an effectiveness check should follow: is the revised barrier still in place, is the new sequence being followed, has the same unsafe condition appeared elsewhere, and have supervisors challenged deviations?
Closing a spreadsheet cell is not the same as closing the risk.
What should you do now?
- Make near-miss reporting simple enough that workers will use it.
- Record the potential consequence, not only the fact nobody was injured.
- Screen RIDDOR requirements separately.
- Preserve useful evidence before site conditions change.
- Identify immediate, underlying and management-system causes where appropriate.
- Review the risk assessment and method if the event challenges existing assumptions.
- Use the hierarchy of control when selecting corrective action.
- Give actions named owners and deadlines.
- Check whether the same weakness exists on other projects.
- Verify afterwards that the corrective action has actually worked.
Our professional view
The phrase “near miss” can make an event sound less significant than it was. What matters is not how close somebody literally came to injury; it is what the event tells management about the controls.
A high-potential near miss is valuable information. The strongest organisations do not celebrate simply because nobody was hurt. They ask what would have happened if the timing, distance or position had been slightly different, and they use that warning to improve the system before the next event.
All Star Safety’s health and safety consultancy service includes accident and incident investigation, root-cause analysis, RIDDOR support and corrective-action planning. Our IOSH Managing Safely courses also cover incident investigation as part of practical risk management.
by admin | Aug 24, 2026 | Health and Safety, NPORS, Slinger Signaller
Plant operators are often discussed in terms of what their employer or principal contractor should provide: training, suitable equipment, traffic routes, supervision and site rules. Those duties remain important, but operators also carry responsibilities of their own. A recent fatal telehandler case shows that an experienced, qualified operator can face personal prosecution when their actions expose someone else to serious risk. HSE Media Centre
A fatal telehandler incident has put individual responsibility in focus
On 18 August 2026, HSE reported the sentencing of a self-employed telehandler operator following the death of a lift supervisor on a construction site in Ince, Ellesmere Port.
The incident happened in June 2023. The lift supervisor was walking back from the welfare compound when he was struck and then reversed over by the telehandler. He sustained fatal injuries. HSE Media Centre
HSE found that the principal contractor had already taken steps to reduce reversing, including providing a turning circle. Importantly, HSE said that the turning circle was unobstructed when the incident occurred.
Despite this, the operator chose to reverse the telehandler without the assistance of a banksman. HSE also found that he had been using his mobile phone while in control of the machine, contrary to site rules he had signed up to. HSE Media Centre
The operator pleaded guilty to breaching section 3(2) of the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974. He received a 12-week prison sentence suspended for 12 months, an £800 fine and an order to pay £2,000 in costs. HSE Media Centre
Read the HSE prosecution notice
There is an important point of accuracy here. This should not be reduced to a headline saying that using a mobile phone while operating plant automatically creates a specific criminal offence.
The prosecution was for the operator’s wider failure to conduct his work without exposing others to risk. His decision to reverse, the available turning arrangements, the absence of a banksman and his use of a phone contrary to site rules were relevant facts identified by HSE.
Company duties do not remove an operator’s own responsibilities
Most construction health and safety discussions rightly focus on employers, contractors and principal contractors because those organisations control many of the circumstances in which work is carried out.
That does not mean responsibility ends there.
Section 3 of the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act places duties on employers and relevant self-employed people to conduct their undertaking so that, so far as is reasonably practicable, people who may be affected are not exposed to health and safety risks. HSE
Construction is specifically one of the high-risk activities for which health and safety law continues to apply to self-employed people. HSE confirms that this includes work carried out on construction sites, including both commercial and domestic work. HSE
Employees also have individual duties.
Under section 7 of the Act, an employee must take reasonable care for their own health and safety and that of other people who may be affected by what they do or fail to do at work. They must also cooperate so far as necessary to enable their employer or another dutyholder to comply with relevant health and safety requirements. HSE
HSE’s enforcement guidance makes the position particularly clear: section 7 places duties on employees irrespective of the obligations placed on their employer. Personal prosecution is therefore possible in appropriate circumstances. HSE
That does not allow an employer to transfer its statutory responsibilities to an operator by writing “operator responsible for all safety” into a method statement.
The two sets of duties exist alongside one another.
A competence card is not permission to depart from the safe system
One of the most significant details in the recent case is that HSE described the telehandler driver as a qualified and experienced operator. HSE Media Centre
That matters.
Training and recognised plant certification provide important evidence that someone has been taught and assessed against an appropriate standard. They do not guarantee how that person will behave every minute they are on site.
HSE’s current workplace transport guidance distinguishes between basic training and what happens afterwards. Drivers need information about the particular workplace, routes, hazards, speed limits, loading areas, procedures and the supervision arrangements that apply. Familiarisation with the actual job and workplace remains important. HSE
In practical terms, an operator may have ten years’ experience and a valid CPCS or NPORS card but still be required to:
- follow the current traffic management plan;
- observe one-way routes;
- use designated turning areas;
- stay within speed limits;
- respect pedestrian exclusion zones;
- comply with restrictions on mobile phones;
- follow agreed signalling arrangements;
- stop if visibility is inadequate; and
- follow reasonable instructions from site management.
A qualification demonstrates a level of competence. It does not give an operator discretion to ignore a site control simply because they believe they can perform the manoeuvre without it.
This is also why competent-operator development should go beyond obtaining the initial card. All Star Safety’s NPORS plant operator training and assessments combine machine-specific training and assessment with the wider hazards operators need to recognise in real site environments. All Star Safety Ltd
Reversing should be designed out before relying on a banksman
The recent case could easily lead to another oversimplification: “telehandlers must always use a banksman when reversing.”
That is not what HSE guidance says.
The stronger control is to remove or reduce the need to reverse in the first place.
HSE’s current construction traffic-management guidance recommends planning vehicle movements so that reversing is avoided where possible. One-way systems and turning circles are specifically identified as ways of achieving this. HSE
This is significant because the site in the recent prosecution apparently had exactly that type of control available: HSE said an unobstructed turning circle had been provided. HSE Media Centre
Where reversing cannot reasonably be eliminated, the remaining risks need to be controlled.
That can include separating pedestrians, improving visibility, using mirrors or CCTV, providing adequate lighting and, where appropriate, using a suitably trained plant or vehicle marshaller. HSE
HSE’s wider workplace transport guidance cautions against treating a banksman as the automatic answer. Putting a signaller close to a reversing vehicle creates its own risk. The preferred approach is first to improve layout, segregation and driver visibility. HSE
Where a signaller is required, the arrangement needs to work properly. Driver and signaller should agree the signals, the signaller must remain visible and stand in a safe position, and the driver should stop if visual contact is lost. HSE
For experienced movement guides who need formal recognition of their occupational competence, All Star Safety also provides the Level 2 NVQ Certificate in Plant Operations – Movement Guide, assessed through actual workplace activity. All Star Safety Ltd
Site rules only work when they are monitored
The individual prosecution does not reduce the importance of management and supervision.
HSE says construction traffic must be effectively managed throughout the construction process. Sites should be organised so that vehicles and pedestrians can move safely, with particular attention to segregation, vehicle movements, turning arrangements, visibility, signs and instructions. HSE
Operators and other workers should understand those arrangements through induction and appropriate site-specific instruction.
But having a rule and enforcing a rule are different things.
If the traffic management plan says vehicles must use a turning circle, supervisors need to notice when operators routinely reverse instead.
If site rules prohibit using a mobile phone while operating plant, a supervisor who repeatedly sees the practice and ignores it is allowing the written system and the actual system to diverge.
HSE’s workplace transport checklist specifically asks whether managers and supervisors routinely challenge and investigate unsafe behaviour. It also expects supervisors to set the correct example themselves. HSE
That does not mean every minor error should immediately result in disciplinary action.
It means unsafe practices need a proportionate response. Depending on the circumstances, that might involve stopping the activity, clarifying the procedure, additional familiarisation, reassessment, refresher training, formal warning or withdrawal of the person’s authorisation to operate the machine.
Repeated unsafe behaviour by an otherwise technically capable operator is still a competence problem.
What should you do now?
Principal contractors and employers should review whether site traffic arrangements are genuinely being followed rather than relying on the existence of a traffic management drawing.
Start with the physical site. Look for opportunities to eliminate reversing, improve turning areas and strengthen pedestrian segregation. Then observe what drivers actually do during normal production, deliveries and busy periods.
Check that operators receive site-specific information as well as holding the appropriate training or competency evidence. Make restrictions on phones, reversing, speed, pedestrian areas and manoeuvring arrangements unambiguous.
Where movement guides are required, confirm that they are trained, authorised and clear about the signalling system being used.
Operators should also understand that signing an induction or receiving a plant authorisation carries responsibilities of its own. If the planned route, signalling arrangement or exclusion zone cannot be followed, stop and raise the issue rather than improvising a less safe alternative.
The safest operator is not necessarily the person who can manoeuvre a machine through the tightest space. It is the person who recognises when the planned control cannot be maintained and stops before somebody is placed at risk.
Our professional view
This prosecution is useful because it challenges two unhelpful assumptions at the same time.
The first is that everything that happens on a construction site is automatically the principal contractor’s fault.
The second is that a qualified and experienced operator can be left entirely to their own judgement because they have already demonstrated competence.
Neither is a sound way to manage risk.
A competent organisation provides suitable routes, procedures, equipment, information and supervision. A competent operator then uses their knowledge and experience within those arrangements, challenges anything that is unsafe and does not deliberately bypass the controls provided.
That is what genuine competence looks like in practice.
For contractors wanting an independent review of plant controls, traffic management, supervision or wider site arrangements, All Star Safety’s health and safety consultancy service includes construction site audits, risk assessment and project-based safety support.